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I. INTRODUCTION
Television has been an increasingly predominant player in American
election politics over the years, especially with presidential elections in the
United States. In 1993, Newton M. Minow, director of the Annenberg
Washington Program, and Marvin Kalb, director of the Joan Shorenstein
* Professor of Media Law, Arizona State University, Cronkite School of Journalism
and Telecommunication. Ph.D., Southern Illinois University, 1985; M.S.L., Yale Law
School, 1998. This Article is a revised version of Professor Youm's "Top Research Faculty
Paper" presented at the annual convention of the Association of Education in Journalism
and Mass Communications (AEJMC) in New Orleans in August 1999. Professor Youm
originally prepared the Article in partial fulfillment of his First Amendment course
requirements as an M.S.L. (Master of Studies in Law) student at Yale Law School in May
1998. He wishes to gratefully acknowledge Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor in
Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law School, for his generous
encouragement in preparing this Article.
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Barone Center at Harvard University, stated "t]he modem presidential
campaign is essentially a television event. The campaign reaches nearly all
voters through television, and it reaches some of them exclusively through
television; for them, the television campaign is the campaign."'
Given the undisputed impact of television on election campaigns, it is
little wonder that the television debate 2 between political candidates has
emerged as one of the most crucial events for voters and candidates. NBC
Executive Producer William 0. Wheatley, Jr. said:
I believe the Presidential debates to be of critical importance in the
way our nation goes about choosing a leader. Indeed, it seems clear
that they have become the most important events of the election-year
calendar, the best opportunity for the candidates to make their cases
directly to a large audience of potential voters and the best chance for
the voters to listen carefully and weigh what the candidates have to
say. 3
On the other hand, various issues relating to television debates have
been a topic of heated discussion among politicians and broadcasters over
the years.4 Congress held hearings on presidential debates on television in
June 1993. Al Swift, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Elections,
noted during the hearings: "If Presidential debates are now a fixture, then
they should be presented to the voters in the most unfiltered and fair way
possible. Many questions need to be addressed. Who should sponsor

1. NEWTON N. MiNow & MARVIN KALB, Preface, in THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES 4 (1993).
2. 'Television debates" are distinguishable from "televised debates." While
"'television debates [are an] undisguised creature of the medium-a political 'talk show'
which is created for and by television' and in which "the audience acts like a studio
audience for a television program oriented toward talk rather than action," televised debates
are "'largely [presented] from the perspective of the immediate audience' and "the
television camera is covering an event, rather than creating one." SUSAN A. HELLWEG ET AL.,
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: ADVOCACY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

29, 30 (1992)

(citations omitted). Regardless, this Article draws no distinction between television debates
and televised debates.
3. Presidential Debates: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House
Comm. on House Administration, 103d Cong. 121 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing on
PresidentialDebates] (statement of William 0. Wheatley, Jr.); see also SIDNEY KRAUS,
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2000).
4. See generally JOHN B. ANDERSON, A PROPER INSTITUTION: GUARANTEEING
TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (1988); WILLIAM L. BENOrT & WILLLAM T. WELLS,
CANDIDATES IN CoNFLICr: PERSUASIVE ATrACK AND DEFENSE IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES (1996); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & DAVID S. BIRDSELL, PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING AN INFORMED ELECTORATE (1988); HELLWEG ET
AL., supra note 2; DAVID J. LANOUE & PETER R. SCHROTT, THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE:
THE HISTORY, IMPACT, AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (1991); THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (AusTIN RANNEY ed., 1979).
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these debates? ...Who should be included? ...What is the role of the
media... T"
The questions posed by Swift are not separate from each other; they
overlap in that the broadcast media's direct participation as a sponsor of
candidate debates often involves the media in determining who should be
included in or excluded from the debates. Also, what kind of broadcast
media are involved as debate sponsors? Are the sponsoring media public
stations or private commercial stations? These and related questions can be
critical because the fundamental rationale behind public broadcasting
6
differs significantly from that of commercial television. Nevertheless,
public television and radio stations operated by state and local governments
have the same rights and responsibilities under the First Amendment as any
private commercial station. On the other hand, judicial interpretations of
the editorial rights of state-owned stations in their programming decisions
have yet to offer a sense of consistency and predictability to public
broadcasting stations.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, held in
1982 that the First Amendment rights of viewers do not impose limits on
the programming discretion of public television stations licensed to state
instrumentalities.8 The court found that the public television stations in
question did not provide the general public a right of access and held that
they were not "public forums." 9 By contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television
° ruled that governmentCommunication Network Foundation (Forbes 1)1
owned television stations could be limited public forums when they
sponsor debates for political candidates. The Eighth Circuit in Forbes v.
Arkansas Educational Television Commission (Forbes I1)11 affirmed its
earlier conclusion that the debate was a limited public forum and a legally
qualified candidate could be excluded
• only if
• the public station sponsoring
•12
the debate had a compelling and narrowly tailored governmental interest.
5. Hearing on PresidentialDebates,supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Al Swift).

6. For a discussion of the differing rationale behind public broadcasting vis-a-vis
commercial broadcasting, see infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
8. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1033 (1983).
9. Id. at 1042. The traditional "public forums" are historically recognized as easily
accessible places where people traditionally gather to communicate their thoughts and
discuss public questions. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37,45 (1983).

10. 22 F.3d 1423, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994).
11. 93 F.3d497 (8th Cir. 1996).
12. See id. at 504-05.
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In an effort to clarify the lower courts' conflicting interpretations of
the editorial decisions of public broadcasting stations, the U.S. Supreme
Court in May 1998 addressed whether a state-owned public television
station creates a limited public forum open to all legally qualified
candidates by conducting a debate among political candidates. In
Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes,14 the Court held
that a state-owned public television station did not violate the First
Amendment by excluding a third-party candidate from a political debate
organized and broadcast
by the television station because the debate was a
5
nonpublic forum.1
Professor Burt Neuborne of the New York University School of Law
characterized Forbes as "a First Amendment tie" because it granted "broad
but not unlimited discretion" to select candidates for a debate sponsored by
public television. 16 But Forbes is more than a number on the First
Amendment score card of the Rehnquist Court. As law Professor Bernard
James at Pepperdine University argued in August 1998, while the issues
involved "at first glance, are relatively narrow in scope and relevant to
limited audiences," Forbes is "worthy of closer examination" because the
case indicates that "the fabric of free-speech protection is woven less
tightly than many assume, allowing government to control speech in ways
that would be unconstitutional without the use of some special power or a
narrow exception on which to rely."'' 7 From a long-term perspective on the
First Amendment jurisprudence, Forbes illustrates the Supreme Court's
willingness to draw "institutional distinctions in the context
of free speech
8
questions arising within the precincts of government.",'
Considering the enormous implications of Forbes--especially for
public broadcasting-this Article examines various First Amendment
issues involved in Forbes. Three questions provide the main focus of the
Article. First, what is the constitutional and statutory framework for
political candidates' access to television debates? Second, how did courts
interpret the political candidates' claims for access to public television
debates prior to Forbes? Finally, how did the U.S. Supreme Court in
13. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Weeding Out of Candidate in TV Debate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at 28.
14. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
15. See id. at 676.
16. Burt Neuborne, Free Expression and the Rehnquist Court, in COMMUNICATIONS
LAW 1295-96 n.50 (1998).
17. Bernard James, In Two Cases, Court OKs Speech Limits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10,
1998, at B15.
18. Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARv. L. REv. 84, 86 (1998).
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Forbes balance the conflicts between the candidates' access rights and the
public broadcast media's editorial freedom?

II. TV DEBATES UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Congress regulates broadcasting differently than the print media.' 9
The First Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ,,20 does not apply to
broadcasters in the same way it does to publishers. As the Supreme Court
stated in 1969, various mass media may be treated differently under the
First Amendment and broadcasters' rights are not equal to those of the print
media. 21
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended,2 requires licensing of
radio and television stations, while there is no such requirement for the
print media. This regulatory framework for broadcasting communication is
derived from the scarcity of the radio spectrum, which should be used for
the general public. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a "classic statement of the
justification for government regulation in broadcasting,"2 3 stated:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently
is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why,
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to government
regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it
must be denied. . . ..The right of free speech does not include,
however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license. The
licensing system established by Congress in the [Act] was a proper
exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it provided for the
licensing of stations was the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity." Denial of a station license
on that ground, if valid under the
24
Act, is not a denial of free speech.
Content regulations of broadcasting, which are also based on the
scarcity of radio waves,25 are extensive to such a degree as to be patently
19. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRAcY

AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH

107-14

(1993).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
22. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 315(a) (Supp. II 1996 & 1994) (licenses are awarded "if
public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby" and licensees are required
to "operate in the public interest").
23. Lee C.Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Pressand PublicAccess: Toward a Theory of
PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH.L. REv. 1, 7 n.21 (1976).
24. National Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).

25. Professor J.M. Balkin of the Yale Law School is critical of the scarcity rationale for
the content regulation of the broadcast media. He wrote in 1996:
The most common argument for special content-based regulations of the media
is based on the scarcity of the airwaves. The word "scarcity" is poorly chosen. All
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unconstitutional if applied to the print media. The personal attack rule is a
good example. This rule requires that if a person is attacked on his honesty,
integrity, character, or similar personal qualities "during the presentation of
views on a controversial issue of public importance," he should be
provided a reasonable amount of free time to respond by the broadcasting
station involved. 6 The Supreme Court upheld the rule, reasoning that "as
far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no
better than those to whom licenses are refused" and that "[i]t is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount." 27
By contrast, the Supreme Court struck down the "right of reply"
statute challenged in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.' The right
of reply law resembled the personal attack rule at issue in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,29 except that the former applied to the print
media while the latter to broadcasting. The Court held that the reply statute
was an unconstitutional governmental restraint on the press because it
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper." 30 The Court
declared that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but

valuable resources are scarce. The scarcity problem in broadcasting stems from
the fact that no two broadcasters can use the same frequency at the same time in
the same geographical area, or they will block each other out. But this problem
can be dealt with by creating a system of property rights dividing up the airwaves
according to frequency, time, place, and broadcasting power; it does not require a
system of government licenses. Moreover, the existing system has actually created
an artificial scarcity in broadcast television. Many VHF and UHF channels go
unused in many localities.
J.M. Balkin, Media Filter, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of BroadcastRegulation, 45
DuKE L.J. 1131, 1133-34 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
26. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(b) (1996). The personal attack rule provides exceptions as
follows:
(1) Personal attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) Personal
attacks occurring during uses by legally qualified candidates; (3) Personal attacks
made during broadcasts not included in paragraph (b)(2) of this section and made
by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokespersons, or those
associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized
spokespersons or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (4)
Bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events, including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing
programs.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(b).
27. Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969). For a recent criticism of the
personal attack rule and related FCC regulations, see Reed Hundt & Blair Levin, D.C.
Circuits:And Protectionfor All, BRiLL's CoNTENT, Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999, at 56.
28. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
29. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
30. Miami HeraldPubl'g Co., 418 U.S. at 256.
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press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated. 3 1
The responsibilities and obligations imposed upon broadcasters to
serve the public are primarily based on the notion that those who receive
licenses to operate radio and television stations are trustees of a valuable
limited resource that belongs to the public. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit articulated the broadcasters'
responsibilities:
A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but
he is not in the same category in terms of public obligations imposed
by law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use
of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts
that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations. A
newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice of its owners; a
broadcasting station cannot.... [A] broadcast
license is a public trust
32
subject to termination for breach of duty.
Among the first obligations imposed on broadcasters was the equal
opportunity rule, as set forth by section 315 of the Act." The rule provided
that any licensee allowing one legally qualified candidate for elective office
to use its station must allow all other candidates for the same office equal
opportunity to use the station. 34 Thus, if airtime is sold to one candidate,
comparable airtime must be offered to all other candidates. If airtime is
given free to one candidate, it must be offered free to all. The equal
opportunity rule, also known as the "equal time" rule, found its policy
justification in "assur[ing] a legally qualified candidate that he would not
be subjected to unfair disadvantage from an opponent through favoritism in
selling or donating time or in scheduling political broadcasts. 35
Similarly, the Supreme Court took special note of the legislative
purpose of the equal opportunity rule in the context of the broadcast
media's role in disseminating political speech: "Recognizing radio's [and
television's] potential importance as a medium of communication of
political ideas, Congress sought to foster its broadest possible utilization by
encouraging broadcasting stations to make their facilities available to

31. Id. For an affirmative comment on the Supreme Court decisions in Red Lion and
MiamiHeraldPublishing Co., see Bollinger, supra note 23. But cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Or of the

[Broadcast]Press, 55 TEXAs L. REv. 39 (1977).

32. Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
33. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994).
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
35. Nicholas Zapple, HistoricalEvolution of Section 315, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 4, at 57.
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At the same time,
candidates for office without discrimination ....,,36
Congress sought to limit the ability of broadcast licensees to utilize their
significant power to achieve electoral success for themselves or their
favorite candidates.37
In the wake of the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's)
ruling in the Lar Daly38 case, Congress substantially revised the equal
opportunity rule 39 in 1959. In response to a mayoral candidate's equal
opportunity complaint, the FCC held that the candidate was entitled to
equal opportunity because the TV stations broadcast film clips of the
candidate's opponent in connection with his official functions as the
incumbent mayor.4 The Lar Daly ruling was a "radical departure" from the
FCC's prior interpretation of the equal opportunity provision. For a number
of years up to 1958, the FCC held the provision inapplicable to the
appearance of a candidate on a newscast on the ground that "such an
appearance did not constitute a 'use' of the broadcast facility insofar as the
not directly or indirectly initiate the filming or presentation of
candidate did
41
event.",
the
The crippling effect of the Lar Daly decision on broadcasters was
unmistakable. The equal opportunity requirement, if the FCC and the
courts strictly enforced the Lar Daly ruling, would "tend to dry up
meaningful radio and television coverage of political campaigns." 42 "The
inevitable consequence [of Lar Daly] is that a broadcaster will be reluctant
to show one political candidate in any news-type program lest he assumes
the burden of presenting a parade of aspirants."' 4344 Consequently, the
public-viewers and listeners-would lose in the end.
While recognizing the conflicting policy goals between active
political debate and rigidly equal political debate under section 315 of the
Act, Congress amended the equal opportunity provision by adding four
exemptions as follows:
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-

36. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959).

37. See McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Brdcst. Auth., 439 A.2d 54, 65 (N.J. 1981).
38. 40 F.C.C. 302 (1959).

39. For a discussion of the equal opportunity rule prior to its 1959 amendment, see Jack
H. Friedenthal & Richard J. Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political
Broadcasting:Section 315 of the CommunicationsAct, 72 HARv. L. REV. 445 (1958-59).
40. See CBS, Inc., 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 238, recons. denied, 18 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 701
(1959).
41. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 351-52 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
42. S. REP. No. 86-562, at 9 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2564, 2572.
43. Id. at 2571.
44. Zapple, supra note 35, at 58.
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(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the
candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects
covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including
but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental
thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within
the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the
presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation
imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for45the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.

Congress was aware of the possibility that exemptions from the equal
opportunity rule might induce a broadcasting station to push its favorite
candidate while ignoring others. It took a calculated risk, however, in
expanding broadcasters' editorial freedom to make judgments in handling
news programs. Congress concluded that insofar as news coverage of
elections was concerned, "[t]he public benefits [of a dynamic coverage of
political campaigns] are so great that they outweight [sic] the risk that may
result from the favoritism that may be shown by some partisan
broadcasters."4"
In a Senate joint resolution in 1960, Congress suspended section 315
of the Act to allow the "Great Debates" between Democrat John F.
Kennedy and Republican Richard M. Nixon.47 Since the FCC had little time
to fully evaluate the 1959 amendment to section 315, Congress temporarily
suspended section 315. 4' The FCC ruled in 1962 that political debates were
45. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
46. S. REP. No. 86-562, at 10.
47. See S.J. Res. 207, 86th Cong. (1960):
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That that part of section 315(a) of the

Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which requires any licensee of a
broadcast station who permits any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station to afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, is
suspended for the period of the 1960 presidential and vice presidential campaigns
with respect to nominees for the offices of President and Vice President of the
United States. Nothing in the foregoing shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in
the public interest.
Pub. L. No. 86-677,74 Stat. 554 (1960).
48. See S. REP. No. 86-1539, at 2 (1960).
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not exempt from the equal opportunity rule. 49 With this action, the FCC
effectively excluded all debates from the equal opportunity requirements of
section 315(a)(4). 0
The FCC decisions of 1962 remained in effect until 1975, when the
FCC overturned the decisions in response to petitions from both the Aspen
Institute Program on Communications and Society and CBS. In what is
now known as the Aspen decision, the FCC ruled:
[D]ebates between qualified political candidates initiated by
nonbroadcast entities (non-studio [sic] debates) . . . will be exempt
from the equal time requirements of [s]ection 315, provided they are
covered live, based upon the good faith determination of licensees that
provided
they are "bona fide news events" worthy of presentation, 5and
1
further that there is no evidence of broadcaster favoritism.
The FCC explained that it based its 1962 decisions on an apparently
"incorrect reading" of the legislative history of the newscast exemptions
52
and subsequent related congressional action. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Chisholm v. FCC3 upheld the FCC's
new ruling on the 1959 Amendment to section 315. The court reasoned that
"the legislative history is inconclusive, but we find much support for the
[FCC's] new interpretation. In these circumstances, we are obligated to
defer to the [FCC's] interpretation, even if it is not the only interpretation
possible. ' 4
In November 1983, the FCC reversed its Aspen decision and held that
the equal opportunity rule exempts broadcaster-sponsored debates. 55 The
FCC noted the congressional intent in amending section 315 in 1959 and
the expected benefits of its new rule:
[A]lthough Congress expressed a concern that the freedom and
flexibility accorded to broadcasters in their news programming might
result in favoritism amongst candidates, Congress intended to permit
49. See NBC, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 370 (1962); Good Will Station, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 362
(1962).
50. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
51. Id. at 351 (footnote omitted).
52. See Petitions of the Aspen Inst. Program on Comm. & Soc'y & CBS, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, para. 22, 35 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 49
(1975). The FCC noted: "Our conclusion that the debates were not exempt rested on
language in the House Report of August 6, 1959, which indicated that in order for on-thespot coverage to be exempt the appearance of the candidates would have to be 'incidental
to' the coverage of a separate news event." Id. (citing Goodwill Station, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 362,
364 (1962)).
53. 538 F.2d 349 (1976).
54. Id. at 366.
55. See Petitions of Henry Geller & Nat'l Ass'n of Brdcsts. & the Radio-TV News Dirs.
Ass'n to Change Common Interp. of Subsections 315(a)(3) and (4) of the Comm. Act,
Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1236, 54 Rad. Reg.2d 1246 (.1983).
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that risk in order to foster a more informed electorate. Congress did not
intend to exclude broadcaster-sponsored debates from the [s]ection 315
exemptions to eliminate any risk of favoritism because to do so would
undermine the informing goal of the statute. In our view, the common
denominator of all exempt programming is bona fide news value.
Thus, a debate's exempt status is not and should not be contingent
upon whether a broadcaster is the sponsoring or controlling entity-for
such control generally would not affect the program's news value.
Furthermore, exempting broadcaster-sponsored debates should serve to
increase
public.556the number of such events, which would ultimately benefit the
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
the new FCC ruling in 1984 without a written opinion.57 Now, debates
among political candidates, regardless of who sponsors the debates, are
news events under the Act and can be sponsored by broadcast stations
without triggering equal time obligations.

I.

ACCESS TO TV DEBATES: LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

The 1983 FCC ruling on section 315 contributed to a sharp increase in
the number of election debates. The total grew from five in 1980, to
fourteen in 1984, and more than forty in 1988.58 Nevertheless, the FCC rule
tends to create "a clear role conflict when media companies are involved
both in trying to arrange debates and in reporting on the progress of the
negotiations., 59 NBC correspondent Andrea Mitchell said that the difficulty
of covering a candidate on the campaign trail would be intensified when
the head of a network was negotiating with that candidate's campaign
6
manager over a debate in which the candidate had enormous interest. 0
One further implication of the FCC rule for political debates was that
it "represents a substantial change because for the first time the broadcast
outlets will decide who will and who will not be included [in the debates].
Again, this will allow broadcast stations not only to report the news, but to
determine it as well.' It should be noted, however, that exclusion of
candidates from debates is not necessarily related to the issue of whether
the broadcast media do sponsor the debates.

56. Id. at para. 19 (footnote omitted).

57. See League of Women Voters Educ. Fund v. FCC, 731 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. See HELLWEG ET AL., supra note 2, at 7-9.
59. Erwin Chemerinsky, Changing the Rules of the Game: The New FCCRegulations
on PoliticalDebates,7 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (1984).
60. See Hearing on PresidentialDebates, supra note 3, at 91 (statement of Paul G.
Kirk, Jr., Cochairman of the Commission on Presidential Debates).

61. Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 14.
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Participation of particular candidates, more often than not, depends on
a number of factors bearing on the candidates themselves, sponsoring
organizations, and the candidates' opponents. Who sponsors the debates, of
course, can be critical to minor-party candidates. "The inclusion of third
parties and independent candidates poses an extremely difficult problem,
especially if the major parties are sponsors of the presidential debates." 62
Thus, Congress has made efforts to solve the issue of whether
candidates' participation in election debates should be institutionalized by
law. Representative Charles Bennett, for example, proposed the
Presidential Candidate Debate Act in 1991" as an amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to require presidential candidates to
participate in debates as a condition for eligibility for payments under the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. The bill defined "presidential
candidate debate" as "a debate at which each candidate nominated for
election to the office of President of the United States by a major party
appears and participates in a regulated exchange of questions and answers
on political, economic, and other issues." The narrow definition of
"debate," however, would not improve the likelihood of third-party
participation in debates. Moreover, there would be no sanctions for those
major-party candidates in refusing to debate a "significant" third-party
candidate. The bill most likely would mandate debates between the two
65
major-party candidates only.
In 1992, Senator Bob Graham and Representative Edward J. Markey
introduced a second bill entitled the National Presidential Debates Act.6
The bill, which would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make
presidential debates "a permanent part of our political process," required
that candidates participate in three presidential debates and one vice
presidential debate in return for federal matching funds. 67 In mandating
debates for presidential candidates, the bill recognized that "candidates
have an obligation to inform and educate the voters because the voters' tax
62. NEWTON N. MINow & CLIFFORD M. SLOAN, FOR GREAT DEBATES:
FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTIAL TV DEBATES 41(1987).

A

NEW PLAN

63. H.R. 60, 102d Cong. (1991).

64. Id. § 2.
65. See Keith Darren Eisner, Comment, Non-major-party Candidates and Televised
PresidentialDebates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1016
(1993).
66. See S. 2213, 102d Cong. (1992). The Presidential Debates Act of 1992 was the
companion bill to the Democracy in Presidential Debates Act introduced in 1991 by
Representative Timothy Penny. H.R. 791, 102d Cong. (1991). For a discussion of the
Democracy in Presidential Debates Act, see infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
67. See Hearing on PresidentialDebates, supra note 3, at 10 (statement of Rep.
Edward J. Markey).
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dollars subsidize the candidates' campaigns." 68 The bill further required
that the presidential candidates participate in debates with all other
candidates who satisfy certain objective criteria for significance, such as
being on the election ballots in at least forty states and eligibility for
receiving matching funds under the Internal Revenue Code or raising not
less than five hundred thousand dollars on or after January 1 of the year
preceding the presidential election year. 69 One flaw of the bill, as originally
submitted to the Senate in 1991, was that it provided that the debate
sponsor be "a nonpartisan or bipartisan organization." 70 As Markey
candidly acknowledged, Congress intended the provision to include "the
possibility of sponsorship by the Commission on Presidential Debates
(CPD), which skillfully staged the 1988 general election debates and which
has continued to play an active and positive role in calling for
institutionalized debates. 71
The Democracy in Presidential Debates Act bill preceded the
proposed National Presidential Debates Act. One commentator termed the
preceding bill as "a reasonable compromise."72 Representative Timothy J.
Penny, who sponsored the Democracy in Presidential Debates Act, stated
that his bill would institutionalize debates in presidential election
campaigns by requiring all "significant candidates to participate in at least
one primary election debate and two general election debates." 73 Under the
criteria set forth in the bill, a "significant" presidential candidate eligible
for participation in debates should be on at least forty state ballots and
receive public financing or have raised at least five hundred thousand
dollars in the years preceding the election. 74 Under these criteria, five
presidential candidates including the two major-party candidates would
have been eligible for general election debates in 1992.75 Penny said that
"[t]he debates must be organized by a nonpartisan entity, and must be
68. Susan E.Spotts, Recent Developments: The PresidentialDebates Act of 1992, 29
ON LEGIS. 561, 562 (1992).
69. See S. 2213, 102d Cong. § 3(e)(3)(A)-(C) (1992).
70. S. 491, 102d Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1991).
71. 137 CONG. REc. 4369, 4370 (1991). The Commission on Presidential Debates
(CPD), a bipartisan group formed by the Republican and Democratic national committees in
1987, was criticized for discriminating against minor-party candidates by allowing the major
parties to dictate debate arrangements. See Hearing on PresidentialDebates,supra note 3,
at 227 (CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Debates in Presidential General Elections).
72. Bennett J. Matelson, Tilting the Electoral Playing Field: The Problem of
Subjectivity in PresidentialElection Law, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1283 (1994) (footnote
HARv. L

omitted).
73. Hearingon PresidentialDebates,supranote 3, at 19.
74. See idat l8.
75. See id.
at 211 (testimony of Deborah Green, president of Ross & Green).
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structured to allow the candidates to question each other directly. If a
candidate refused to participate in the required debates, he or she would
lose their federal matching funds. 76
In contrast to the National Presidential Debates Act, the Democracy
in Presidential Debates Act would provide for sponsorship of debates by
only nonpartisan organizations and the CPD controversy would be
obviated. Most significantly, the Democracy in Presidential Debates bill
provided an opportunity for significant minor-party candidates to
participate in the debates with major-party candidates. The inclusion of
third-party candidates in the debates can improve the overall quality of the
debates in that candidates outside of the two major parties can force
discussion issues that the major-party candidates tend to ignore and they
can expose the voters to a wider range of views."7 Stuart Reges, the
National Director of the Libertarian Party, described the third parties'
important role in American politics:
From the Socialist Party to the People's Party to the Prohibition Party,
the traditional role of third parties in this country has been to focus on
issues not being addressed by the major parties. Third parties and
independents are usually more in touch with the immediate concerns of
the American public and are willing to say what the major candidates
are often afraid to say.
Far from being a distraction, inclusion of third party candidates
would enliven the debates and make them much more valuable to the
American people. Most of these people will probably choose not to
vote for the third party candidates they hear, but they will be glad the
third parties were in the debates to focus them more on the pressing
issues of the day.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ACCESS TO TELEVISION
DEBATES: PRE-FORBES CASES
During an oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court on October 8,
1997, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist asked attorney Kelly J.
Shackelford, who represented Ralph P. Forbes in Forbes v. Arkansas
EducationalTelevision Commission:79 "Well, how about a [s]tate where the
write-in procedure is very simple, and someone who is perhaps defeated in
a primary is going to run as a write-in, and his name is Willy Wacko, and
he's regarded as a total loser by all political observers. Do [government
76.
77.
78.
Reges,
79.

Id. at 19 (statement of Rep. Penny).
See Spotts, supra note 68, at 577.
Hearing on PresidentialDebates, supra note 3, at 166-67 (statement of Stuart
National Director of the Libertarian Party).
22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,520 U.S. 1114 (1997).
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officials] have to give him access [to the public TV debate]?"' Shackelford
replied: "No . . . I don't think they do. Again, you have an objective
standard, set in place beforehand, a ballot access law. That's perfectly
allowed.... [W]hat the Court has said is, it's okay to ensure a modicum of
support. However, the Court ' has never said that the [g]overnment can
81
subjectively pick and choose.'
In many ways, the colloquy between Chief Justice Rehnquist and
attorney Shackelford illuminates the complexity of determining who will
be invited to candidate debates. Access to airtime for legally qualified
candidates for federal elective office is allowed under section 312 of the
Act unless the exemptions to the equal opportunity rule apply. As discussed
previously, political debates are one of the exemptions to the equal
82
opportunity rule. Nevertheless, the exclusion from political debates of

minor-party candidates from presidential debates has been "a persistent
source of litigation. ' Those candidates who demand access to debates
often turned to the First Amendment in making their claims against the
private sponsors or broadcasters carrying the debates.
Johnson v. FC&4 is the seminal case in which the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a presidential
candidate's claim for access to television debates. Sonia Johnson, the 1984
presidential candidate of the Citizens Party, sought an order from the FCC
that the League of Women Voters (League) should include her in their
television debates in the fall of 1984. She asserted that, if the League
excluded her, the debates would violate her rights under the Act and the

First Amendment. 5 The FCC rejected Johnson's complaint.
On appeal, Johnson argued that her exclusion from the 1984 debates
restricted her access to the ballot and infringed her associational choices
under the First Amendment because the television debates by 1984 had

become "so institutionalized as to be a prerequisite for election. 86 The
D.C. Circuit characterized Johnson's argument as one that "essentially
boils down to a demand for broadcast access." 87 The court acknowledged
that broadcast media's "tremendous power to inform and shape public
80. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, No. 96-779, 1997 WL 664266, at *33 (U.S.
Oct. 8, 1997) (U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript).
81. Id.
82. For a discussion of the FCC's interpretation of the exemptions to section 315 of the
Communications Act, see supra notes 40-41, 50-56 and accompanying text.
83. Matelson, supra note 72, at 1238.
84. 829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
85. See id. at 159.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 160.
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opinion and the immutable scarcity of broadcast frequencies have created
both tremendous opportunities and serious hazard for free expression."
The federal appeals court continued: "We face a far more pervasive scheme
of regulation, and a significantly greater congressional sensitivity when...
the First Amendment rights of candidates for public office and their
supporters are involved."'8 9
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit rejected Johnson's assertion that the
voices of minor-party candidates might be silenced by the major parties or
encounter discrimination from biases of large broadcasters. The court
pointed to the Act as a mechanism that prevents political debates from
being monopolized by one or a few candidates and that enables candidates
with all different political viewpoints to use the media.90
The federal appeals court held that "the televising of a debate
sponsored by a non-network [sic] third party does not itself trigger access
for competing candidates" under the equal opportunity provisions of the
Act. 91 The court also noted that candidates have no "legally cognizable"
right under the First Amendment to participate in the broadcast debates
organized by a nonbroadcast party.
Johnson's demand for access to a particular program, in this case,
televised debates, would raise "the risk of an enlargement of [g]overnment
control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues." 92 While
broadcasters do not enjoy the same First Amendment journalistic freedom
as newspapers, the court emphasized congressional and judicial refusal to
allow unlimited governmental interference in the programming decisions of
broadcasters. 93 The court then expressed its awareness of "the importance
of preserving a large measure of journalistic discretion for broadcasters as a
serious First Amendment issue. ' 94
The Johnson ruling has clearly eliminated any further First
Amendment claims for a right to access to debates televised by private
sponsors. In 1994, one legal commentator argued: "Remarkably, this has
also been true of [F]irst [A]mendment claims of viewpoint discrimination
brought against public television stations who sponsor debates and select
debate participants." 95

88. Id.

89. Id. at 161.
90. See id.
91. Id.

92. Id. at 162 (footnote omitted).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 163.

95. Matelson, supra note 72, at 1259.
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A closer look at several cases arising from television debates
sponsored by public television stations indicates, however, that it has not
been as remarkable as it seems. Four years after Johnson, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled on a claim of a gubernatorial candidate for access to
primary election "forums" organized by a public television network in New
Jersey. 9' In 1990, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits also confronted the issue
of whether public television stations may exclude legally qualified
candidates for public office from debates.97 More recently, the Eighth
Circuit overruled its 1990 decision.9 The conflict between these circuits
has highlighted the thorny issue of how editorial autonomy should be
defined according to the private or public status of broadcasters under the
First Amendment."
The increasing litigation against public broadcasting stations since
1990 should come as little surprise because "It]he growth of public
broadcasting in recent years has been accompanied by controversy in
certain quarters regarding the autonomy of that institution, especially with
regard to program content generally and news and public affairs programs
in particular."' ° McGlynn v. New Jersey Public BroadcastingAuthority01
is a good example. McGlynn, which the New Jersey Supreme Court
described as "a case of major importance," 1 2 concerned the relationship
between the journalistic freedom of public television stations and their duty
of fairness in election coverage.
This 1981 New Jersey case involved Richard McGlynn, a candidate
for the Republican nomination for governor. McGlynn challenged the
refusal of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority (Authority) to
include him in a forum on major issues to be telecast by the Authority
during the final week of the 1981 primary campaign. He alleged that his

96. See McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Brdcst. Auth., 439 A.2d 54 (N.J. 1981).
97. See Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 489 (1lth Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991); DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990),
overruled by Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423 (8th

Cir. 1994) (en banc).

98. See Forbes, 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 523 U.S. 666 (overruling
DeYoung, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990)).
99. See Erick Howard, Comment, DebatingPBS: Public Broadcasting and the Power
to Exclude PoliticalCandidatesfrom Televised Debates, 1995 U. CmH. LEGAL F. 435, 436

(1995).
100. Annotation, State Regulation of Content of and Representation on Program
Presented by "Public Broadcasting" Television or Radio Station, 27 A.L.R. 4th 375, 376

(1984).
101. 439 A.2d 54 (N.J. 1981).

102. Id. at 56.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

exclusion from the program violated various state statutes regulating
elections and public broadcasting as well as the Act.'0 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that "[o]ne of the
crucial problems facing any candidate, especially one of limited means, is
access to television."' 0 4 The court held that Congress granted the Authority
"wide discretion" in determining broadcast content, subject only to
considerations of "fairness."'0 5 The court held:
We emphasize now that the statute governing the Authority,
designed to promote the public interest, does not confer on an
individual candidate a right to be included in any given program or
series of programs. His only right is to fairness, balance[,J and equity
in the entiretyl of the Authority's election coverage over the course of
the campaign.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected the public forum
concept in access to the broadcast since the concept has been strictly
limited to those areas in which everyone has been historically free to speak,
except for the "time, place, or manner" restrictions. 1 7 The public does not
have a general right of access to the state public television, the court ruled,
but legally qualified candidates may be granted the right of access under
section 312 of the Act. The court concluded that the Authority's exclusion
of McGlynn from the forum was a "reasonable exercise" of the Authority's
right to make editorial judgments pursuant to federal and state law. o8
The Eighth Circuit in 1990 ruled that candidates have no First
Amendment right to participate in election debates televised on public
broadcast networks. In DeYoung v. Patten,10 9 the Iowa Public Television
(IPT) excluded Garry DeYoung, a legally qualified candidate for U.S.
Senate, from a debate between the two major-party candidates aired in
1984. He sued IPT, Executive Producer Larry G. Patten, Program Director
John C. White, and Iowa Press commentator Dean Borg alleging that IPT
and its employees had violated his First Amendment rights by excluding
him from the debate and denying his request for equal time, which also
violated his rights under the Act.1 0
DeYoung also claimed that IPT manipulated the political process and
contributed to his loss in the 1984 Senate election. He sought thirty
103. See id.
104. Id. at 60.
105. Id. at 64.
106. Id. at 72.

107. Id. at 64.

108. See id.
109. 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990).
110. See id. at 630.
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thousand dollars in damages against IPT and others for "'social ostracism,
denial of access to the public, manipulation of the political process, and
mental anguish.'. ' . The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that
DeYoung had failed to state a claim because he had no First Amendment
right to appear on public television or on a particular program. In addition,
cause of action exists under the equal
they asserted that no private
12
opportunity rule of the Act.1
The federal district court dismissed DeYoung's suit, holding that he
had no First Amendment right to broadcast time and that the FCC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the equal opportunity claim. The court ruled that
there was no "state action" because the state had "administratively"
distanced itself from the editorial and programming decisions of IPT and
others." 3 DeYoung appealed the district court's ruling, maintaining that the
decision was erroneous in determining that there was no state action in
IPT's exclusion of him from the television debate.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the
defendants did not act under color of state law in excluding DeYoung.
Applying the traditional definitions of acting under color of state law'1 and
state action, 115 the court found that IPT, a state agency, employed White,
Patten, and Borg, and thus the three were state actors. "[G]enerally, a
public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his [or her]
official capacity or while exercising his [or her] responsibilities pursuant to
state law," the court said. u 6
However, the federal appeals court agreed with the district court that
DeYoung had no First Amendment right to appear on television, "at least to
any extent greater than the limited right of access granted by the equal time
provisions of the [Act]."" 7 The court emphatically declared that a political
candidate "does not have a 'constitutional right of broadcast access to air

111. Id. (citation omitted).

112. See iL
113. Id. at631.
114. "The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the
defendant in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action have exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law."' West v. Atldns, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)).
115. "To constitute state action, 'the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State... or by a person for whom the State is responsible,'
and 'the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a

state actor."' Id. (citation omitted).
116. DeYoung, 898 F.2d at 632 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

117. Id.
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his [or her] views."' '.. The court ruled DeYoung's claim invalid on the
ground that a public television station is not a public forum. A public
station would be a public forum if it were "designed to provide a general
public right of access to its use" or if a history of public access existed
insofar as it did not conflict with the station's primary activity.1 '9 In
rejecting DeYoung's monetary claims, as the district court did, the appeals
court held that the Act did not provide for a private cause of action for
violation of the equal opportunity provisions.' 20 The proper procedure
would be to complain to the FCC.121
The second case involving candidates' access claims to public
television was Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications
Commission. 22 Chandler, which followed four months after DeYoung,
arose from a dispute over a television debate between candidates for the
lieutenant governorship of Georgia. Walker Chandler, the Libertarian
candidate for lieutenant governor of Georgia, sought to enjoin the Georgia
Public Telecommunications Commission (GPTC) from broadcasting the
debate sponsored by GPTC unless GPTC included him in the debate.
GPTC invited only the Democratic and Republican candidates to the
debate,'23 while offering Chandler thirty minutes of airtime as an
opportunity to present his views under section 315 of the Act. 24 In his suit
filed in federal district court, Chandler contended that such an exclusion
violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The federal district court in Georgia issued a temporary restraining
order to GPTC either to include Chandler in the debate or not to broadcast
the program. The court held that exclusion of ballot-qualified candidates
solely on the basis of the popularity of their political opinions was
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and an
impermissible prior restraint on speech.12 5 The court further held that even
under minimal scrutiny, the state could produce no rational justification for
2
rejecting Chandler and thus had violated his Equal Protection rights.1 1

118. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d
417,430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
119. Id. at 633 (citing Muir v. Alabama Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
120. See id.

121. See id. at 635.
122. 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
123. See id. at 488.
124. Seeid. at488n.1.

125. See Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecomms. Comm'n, 749 F. Supp. 264, 268 (N.D.
Ga. 1990), vacated, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 (1991).

126. See id. at 269.

Number 3]

EDITORIAL RIGHTS VS. CANDIDATES' ACCESS

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order promptly. The
federal appeals court held that GPTC was not a public forum because it was
not accessible to everyone who had a message. The court stated:
[The degree of control that a public broadcast licensee can exercise
over its broadcast programming consistent with the First Amendment
depends on the mission of the communicative activity being
controlled. Where the activity does not function as a pure marketplace
in order to prevent
of ideas, the state is permitted to regulate content
27
hampering the primary function of the activity.1
GPTC as a public television station had an obligation to serve the
public interest. GPTC's employees made the editorial judgments on their
programs to meet their public interest requirements, according to the
appeals court. The court added: "Obviously a decision to broadcast one
program excludes, for that time, all other programs."'
The federal appeals court rejected the district court's conclusion that
GPTC's exclusion of candidates from television debates was viewpoint
restrictive in violation of the First Amendment. The appeals court reasoned
that GPTC's decision to invite only the Democratic and Republican
candidates to a debate related to its determination that the debate
exclusively between the two candidates would be "of the most interest and
benefit" to Georgia's citizens.129 "A decision to air any show is necessarily
content-based," the court stated, and it is "reasonable" if it is "'not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
views."" 30 Referring to DeYoung, the Eleventh Circuit noted that they were
grant
not alone in finding that "the First Amendment does not necessarily
31
political candidates the right to be included in candidate debates."'
The Eleventh Circuit, however, warned against the "Orwellian state
thought control" of public television stations through selective broadcasting
of viewpoints.' Without deciding, the court predicted that "the use of state
instrumentalities to suppress unwarranted expressions in the marketplace of
ideas would authorize judicial intervention to vindicate the First
Amendment. 133 On the other hand, the court expressed concern that
requiring public television stations to include all qualified candidates in
debates would force the stations to forgo broadcasting controversial views.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Chandler,917 F.2d at 488 (citation omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 489.
Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,

800 (1985)).
131. Id. at 489 n.5 (citing DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990)).
132. Id. at 489.
133. Id.
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The court concluded: "The values sought to be fostered by the First
Amendment would be frustrated, not furthered, by the fitting of such
harshness on public television."' 34
Judge Thomas A. Clark, in his dissent, claimed that while GPTC was
not a traditional public forum, it was "at a minimum . . . a nonpublic
forum" through which "candidates' ideas will be exchanged on the issue of
state governance and will then be telecast to voters throughout Georgia."'
Relying on the First Amendment standards for application of the nonpublic
forum doctrine, 3 6 he accepted the district court's finding that 37
GPTC's
exclusion of Chandler was unreasonable and not viewpoint neutral.
Noting a distinction between private and public broadcasters in their
right to exclude qualified candidates from debates, Judge Clark stated that
private broadcast networks may be justified in their exclusion of candidates
from debates,13 but public broadcasters may not. He called attention to the
raison d'tre of public broadcasting, which is "significantly different" from
that of private broadcasting:
Public broadcasting is premised on the belief that the free market will
not provide all of the programming and information necessary for an
educated public. Thus, many programs that would fail miserably to pay
their own way on the private networks appear on public
39 television. The
political debates at issue appear to be a case in point.
Judge Clark compared GPTC's exclusion of Chandler from the
television debates to the government's action to prevent expression "simply
because officials do not agree with the message conveyed. ' ' 40 He
emphasized the value of an informed electorate to our political process:
"The [informed] electorate is the ultimate check on governmental abuse of
power. To allow political appointees . . . to 'pick and choose' the
134. Id. at 490.
135. Id. at 491 (Clark, J., dissenting).

136. Judge Clark quoted Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. in
his discussion of the nonpublic forum doctrine:

Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Although a speaker may
be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not
encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class
of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the government
violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress
the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
Id. at 491 (Clark, J., dissenting ) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
137. See id.

138. See id. at 492 (citing Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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information the public receives from the interplay of candidates speaking
unrehearsed
short-circuits [sic] the controls built into our governmental
141
system."
Judge Clark criticized the majority for failing to differentiate political
debates from news or documentary programs. The ideas conveyed in a
particular television news program may be expressed through a wide
variety of media in an equally effective manner, he acknowledged, but
candidates' political speech through debates is vastly different:
[A]n idea is not a candidate, and freedom of speech has a greater
meaning in the election arena. There is only one way for candidates
themselves to argue their positions with each other: through the
medium of a debate. A debate serves to inform the public far more
effectively than any candidate's lone appearance could, by creating a
synergism between the candidates' immediately conflicting positions.
For the state to set up such a debate and exclude certain candidates not
only puts its stamp of approval on the favored candidates, it also
"curtail[s] access to ideas" by preventing the ideas and information
that would be produced
142 through the debating candidates' interaction
from coming to light.
In 1996, the Eighth Circuit refused to enjoin a state-run television
network from staging debates from excluding third-party candidates. In
Marcus v. Iowa Public Television,'43 Jay B. Marcus, the Natural Law Party
candidate for Congress from Iowa, and others sued Iowa Public Television
(IPTV), seeking injunctive relief requiring IPTV to include all legally
qualified candidates in the "joint conferences"' 44 of major-party candidates
in the Iowa Pressprograms in October 1996.145
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, applying
ForbesII, found the "Iowa Press" programs a limited public forum because
a public television network staged them as an opportunity for the public to
hear the views of the candidates interviewed on the programs.1
Nevertheless, the court rejected Marcus's claim that IPTV violated his First
Amendment rights by excluding him from the candidate debates. Again
141. Id.
142. Id. at 493-94.

143. 97 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1996).
144. The federal district court stated that while the Iowa Press programs typically "are
not debates but simply journalists' interviews of persons in the news generally," reasonable
people watching the "joint appearances" in the programs of the major candidates for
Congress from Iowa would have found the programs "debates" among the candidates.
Marcus v. Iowa Pub. TV,24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2531, 2532 (S.D. Iowa 1996).
145. See id. at 2531.
146. See id.
at 2532-33 (citing Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n Network, 93 F.3d
497 (8th Cir. 1996)). The district court cited the slip opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Forbes
v. Arkansas EducationalTelevision CommunicationsNetwork.
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relying on Forbes 11, the court held: "Persons presenting political
viewpoints on a public television network may be excluded from staged
debates if the exclusion is narrowly tailored and will serve compelling state
interests.' 47
The district court said that IPTV did not arbitrarily exclude Marcus
but excluded him for "principled" reasons. 148 The court found a "sufficient
state interest" in IPTV's determination that the programs were "bona fide
news interview" programs and that Marcus was not "newsworthy" as a
candidate. 149 In concluding that IPTV established "a compelling state
interest" in excluding Marcus, the court stated:
It is profoundly important that the defendant network and its news
editor be allowed to exercise independent journalistic and editorial
judgments based on newsworthiness. If the defendant network may not
exercise independent and editorial discretion in determining the
content of its programs, the network would be fundamentally bland
and of little value to the public it serves.150
According to the district court, IPTV's operation as a press institution
free from political pressure from within and without state government is "a
compelling governmental purpose" to achieve under the Act and its
relevant FCC rules and regulations.15 ' The court also determined that
IPTV's exclusion of Marcus was "narrowly tailored" to serve the
compelling state interest. It noted that IPTV offered Marcus an equal time
opportunity on other IPTV programs to present his views and that IPTV's
action against Marcus was "an exercise of journalistic discretion [that]
meets generally accepted broadcast
industry standards for making
52
judgments about newsworthiness."
Rejecting Marcus's assertion that Forbes II should be controlling
precedent, the district court distinguished ForbesII from the case at bar. In
ForbesII, the Arkansas public television station did not have a compelling
and narrowly tailored justification for excluding Forbes solely because it
did not consider him to be a "viable" candidate. By contrast, the court
stated, the present case addressed Marcus's
"lack of newsworthiness and
3
not lack of viability" as a candidate.15

147. Id. at 2533 (citation omitted).
148. See id. (citing Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n, 22 F.3d 1423, 1429 (8th Cir.

1994)).
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. Id. (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2533.
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denied Marcus
On appeal, 154a three-judge panel of the Eighth• Circuit
155
injunctive relief. The court, in a two-to-one opinion, disagreed with the
district court that Marcus had failed to show irreparable harm. If Marcus's
claim that he had a First Amendment right to speak on IPTV's limited
public forum was valid on First Amendment grounds, it would constitute
"an irreparable harm."'1 56 The court of appeals, in balancing the harms of
both parties, accepted the district court's determination that IPTV would
suffer greater harm from the grant of injunction than Marcus from denial of
the injunction. The court recognized IPTV as a state actor, but it "is a
media organization, which necessarily must make editorial decisions
regarding the content of its programming."' 57 The court continued:
"Interference with that editorial discretion constitutes a significant injury to
the editorial integrity of IPTV, which interferes with their primary mission
of serving the public.' ' 158 Additionally, the court, in illustrating the
substantial possible harm of the injunction to IPTV, stated that IPTV would
cancel the debates entirely "rather than impair its journalistic integrity and
its credibility with its viewers. 1 59
Similar to the district court's refusal to apply Forbes 11,60 the Eighth
Circuit rejected Marcus's Forbes I-based argument that I1TV excluded
him based on a "subjective" determination of newsworthiness and thus
improperly exercised state authority. 161 The appeals court narrowed the
application of Forbes II: "Forbes I cannot be read to mandate the
inclusion of every candidate on the ballot for any debate sponsored by a
public television station. Nor does ForbesII suggest that public television
station administrators, because they are government actors, have no
discretion whatsoever in making broadcast determinations."' 62 In addition,
the appeals court reiterated the district court's distinction between Forbes
II and the present case, stating that a candidate's "viability" was a matter of
political choice for voters to make, while a candidate's "newsworthiness"
was a matter of journalistic discretion.
. ..

.

154. See Marcus v. Iowa Pub. TV, 97 F.3d 1137, 1138 (8th Cir. 1996).
155. Judge George J. Fagg joined Judge Frank J. Magill, author of the majority opinion.
It is noteworthy that Judges Magill and Fagg dissented in ForbesL
156. Marcus, 97 F.3d at 1140.
157. Id. at 1141.

158. Id. (quoting Appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to Emergency Motion at 7).
159. IL

160. See supranote 153 and accompanying text.
161. See Marcus, 97 F.3d at 1142.
162. Id.
163. See id. For a discussion of the district court's distinction between Forbes and

Marcus,see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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The Eighth Circuit held that IPTV, "[b]y its very nature and under
controlling policies" as a media organ, "must be concerned with the
newsworthiness of the issues and speakers included in its programming. '"' 64
Noting the structural and procedural mechanism in ensuring the
"journalistic and editorial integrity" of PTV's programming, the court
acknowledged IPTV's compelling interest in meeting its public service
goals to serve the citizenry of Iowa and of limiting access to newsworthy
candidates. 65 The court concluded:
[T]here is also a public interest in having a debate between some
candidates rather than having no debate whatsoever. In addition[,] ...
IPTV's professional broadcasters are generally better aware of what
constitutes appropriate programming than a group of federal judges; it
is clearly in the public interest in having a state-operated aublic
television free from unnecessary interference by a federal court.
In his rather brief dissent, Judge C. Arlen Beam argued that Forbes II
should be binding upon the present case because the two cases deal with
the exclusion of legally qualified candidates from television debates
sponsored by public television stations. 67 He also contended that the
television stations excluded Forbes and Marcus on similarly subjective
grounds. No one could advance a "realistic argument" that rPTV's opinion
on Marcus's "newsworthiness" and the Arkansas television network's
conclusion regarding Forbes's "political viability" are distinguishable.'6
Quoting extensively from Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold's opinion in
Forbes 11, Judge Beam stated that "[t]he court169(and the district court as
well) seeks to distinguish the indistinguishable."
While the petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari in Forbes
II was pending, the Eighth Circuit agreed to review Marcus en banc.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit postponed considering Marcus until the
On June 30, 1998, the federal
U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Forbes /.170
appeals court, affirming the district court's decision, held that the Supreme
Court's decision in Forbes controlled because the broadcasters did not
exclude third-party171candidates because of their viewpoint and the exclusion
was "reasonable.'
164. Marcus, 97 F.3d at 1142.
165. See id. at 1142-44.
166. Id. at 1144.
167. See id. (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See Brief for the FCC and the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 98-7790), cert.
granted,520 U.S. 1114, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 1639 (1997) (No. 96-779).
171. Marcus v. Iowa Pub. TV, 150 F.3d 924, 925 (8th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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V. ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION V.
FORBES: THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING

Ralph P. Forbes was not invited to a debate between the two majorparty candidates for Congress in Arkansas in 1992. Forbes, a ballotqualified independent candidate, sued the debate's organizers, Arkansas
Educational Television Network (AETN), alleging that he had a right to
participate in the debate and that AETN officials excluded him from the
debate because of his political beliefs.' 72 He sought injunctive relief in an
Arkansas federal district court and moved for preliminary injunction to
mandate his inclusion in the debate. 7 1 The federal district court dismissed
Forbes's request for injunctive relief on October 20, 1992. Judge Arnold,
sitting as a single circuit judge, rejected Forbes's request for an injunction
pending appeal, and a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Arnold's
decision, reasoning that DeYoung controlled. T7
Forbes renewed his claims against AETN on November 2, 1992,
while amending his complaint by including private television stations. In
response, AETN argued that Forbes had no rights under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments to appear in a television debate and failed to state
a cause of action against AETN. The district court agreed and concluded,
following DeYoung, that Forbes had no First Amendment right of access to
the public airwaves and that the Act did not provide a private cause of
action.
Forbes appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit in Forbes I,17 sitting en bane, affirmed
in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. The appeals court
agreed with the district court that there was no private cause of action to
enforce the Act and that Forbes should have brought his claim before the
FCC.177 The appeals court held, however, that Forbes had a "qualified right
of access" created by AETN's sponsorship of the debate. 178 The court took

172. In support of his claim that AETN discriminated against him in the debate based on
his policy views, Forbes claimed that an AETN official said that "the network would run
'St. Elsewhere' [sic] rather than a debate that [would include him] and that another AETN
official stated that Forbes [was excluded] because he was not a 'serious' candidate." Forbes
v. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n, 22 F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994).
173. See id

174. See id. at 1427. For a discussion of DeYoung, see supra notes 109-21 and
accompanying text.
175. See id.

176. 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
177. See generallyid.

178. See id. at 1428.
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special note of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to AETN's
actions as a state actor, unlike those of private television stations.
Characterizing DeYoung as "wrongly decided," the Eighth Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Arnold for the six-to-five majority, held that a stateowned television station cannot exclude candidates from debates on the
basis of their viewpoints "absent a compelling state interest." 179 The court,
applying the "limited public forum" doctrine,8 0 found that the debate at
issue was a limited public forum. The court reasoned: "Since the key
determination of whether a forum is a limited public one is the
government's acquiescence in its use for expressive purposes, it is certainly
possible that AETN created a limited public forum when it chose to
sponsor a debate among the candidates for the [t]hird [c]ongressional
seat."' 8' The court held that if it determined the debate to be a limited
public forum, Forbes would have a First Amendment right to access the
debate. 182
Even under the nonpublic forum analysis, 183 the Eighth Circuit ruled
that "if AETN failed to include Forbes because of objections to his
viewpoint, it has violated his First Amendment rights."'' 4 The court noted
that Forbes was a member of the class of speakers-candidates for the third
district congressional seat-for whose special benefit AETN created the
debate and he wished to address the topic encompassed by the debatewho should be elected to Congress.
In an obvious effort to avoid ambiguity with respect to the limitations
of its ruling, the Eighth Circuit went to great lengths to include a statement
of clarification: "Our holding applies only to debates that are sponsored by
state instrumentalities. It does not apply to private-television-sponsored
debates, nor to debates sponsored by third parties that are reported in good
faith by public television stations." 186 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether AETN could provide "a rational

179. Id. at 1428-29.
180. Id. The Eighth Circuit defined the limited public forum as "a place that generally is
not open for public expression, but that the government has opened for use for free speech
for only a limited period of time, a limited topic, or a limited class of speakers." Id. at 1429
(citations omitted).
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. For a discussion of the nonpublic forum analysis, see supra note 136.
184. Forbes,22 F.3d at 1429.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 1430 n.5.
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justification" for its exclusion of Forbes from the
and viewpoint-neutral
187
debate.
Judge T. McMillian, joined by four judges, filed a spirited dissent.
Judge McMillian, who authored the now overruled Young decision, took
issue with the majority's ruling that Forbes was a legally qualified
candidate with a First Amendment right to participate in the debate and the
debate was a public forum for First Amendment purposes. Calling the
debate a "nonpublic forum," he argued: "Like private commercial
television, public television is not a traditional public forum; it does not
extend a general invitation to the public to appear on or participate in its
programs. ' 88 Moreover, he held that the debate was not a "limited or quasi
public forum" either. He said: "[T]he format of this candidate debate was
not compatible with either unrestricted public access or with unrestricted
access by all of the legally qualified candidates."' 89
Judge McMillian stated that the debate would be a nonpublic forum.
Control over access to the debate, according to him, could be based on
speaker identity "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."' He asserted
that if AETN had excluded Forbes from the debate within the "editorial and
programming discretion" to structure the debate, AETN's action would be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.' 9'
On remand, a jury heard the case in June 1995. The district court held
that the television debate sponsored by AETN was a nonpublic forum. A
jury found that AETN's exclusion of Forbes from the debate did not result
from political pressure or from its opposition to his political opinions. The
district court entered judgment for AETN.'92
In ForbesII, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court agreed
with Forbes that the debate was a limited public forum and that AETN's
stated reason for excluding him-that he was not a "viable" candidatewas not legally sufficient. The court held: "[A] governmentally owned and
controlled television station may not exclude a candidate, legally qualified
under state law, from a debate organized by it on such a subjective ground.

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1430.
IIdat 1431.
Id. at 1431-32.
Id. at 1432 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473

U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
191. Id
192. See generallyForbes v. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
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To uphold such
a defense would, in our view, place too much faith in
193
government.'
While admitting that there is "no bright line or objective test" for
determining the character of the debate, the court stated "without
reservation" that the debate was "a limited public forum" in that AETN, by
staging the debate, opened its facilities to candidates running for the third
district congressional seat to express their views on campaign issues.' 94 The
exclusion by AETN of Forbes from the debate on no basis other than party
affiliation was untenable either as a matter of law or logic, according to the
court. "It must be emphasized that we are dealing here with political speech
by legally qualified candidates, a subject matter at the very core of the First
Amendment, and the exclusion of one such speaker has the effect of a prior
restraint-it keeps his views from the public on the occasion in
question."'9
The appeals court rejected the legal sufficiency of AETN's
determination of Forbes's "political viability" as a candidate as a reason for
excluding him from the debate. The court declared:
The question of political viability is, indeed, so subjective, so arguable,
so susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no
secure basis for the exercise of the First Amendment .... Political
viability is a tricky concept. We should leave it to the voters at the
polls, and to the professional judgment of nongovernmental journalists.
A journalist employed by the government is still a government
employee. 96
The court determined that those people who made the judgment about
Forbes were not ordinary journalists but government employees. The court
added: "The First Amendment exists to protect individuals, not
government." 197
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision that a
political debate controlled by a state-owned television station constituted a
public forum and that the candidate could not be excluded without violating
the Constitution. The Court stated:
[T]he public forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical
way to the very different context of public television broadcasting....
In the case of television broadcasting ... broad rights of access for
outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the

193. Id. at 500.
194. See id. at 504.
195. Id.

196. Id. at 505.
197. Id.
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discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill
their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations. 98
The majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that
the broadcasters' "public interest, convenience, and necessity" obligations
under the Act require both public and private broadcasters to exercise
substantial editorial discretion in selecting their programming!, "As a
general rule," the Supreme Court held, "the nature of editorial discretion
counsels against subjecting broadcasters to claims of viewpoint
discrimination."
In connection with the editorial discretion of
broadcasters, the Court cautioned against judicial involvement in the
programming decisions of the broadcasters: "Were the judiciary to require,
and so to define and approve, pre-established [sic] criteria for access, it
would risk implicating the courts 2in
0' judgments that should be left to the
discretion."
journalistic
of
exercise
The Court further ruled that "in most cases, the First Amendment of
its own force does not compel public broadcasters to allow third parties
access to their programming. ' '202 But the Court recognized a narrow
exception to the limitation in the context of candidate debates. Unlike other
broadcasts, according to the Court, debates are by design a forum for
political speech by candidates. They are also "of exceptional significance in
the electoral process. '20 3 The Court elaborated:
Deliberation on the positions and qualifications of candidates is
integral to our system of government, and electoral speech may have
its most profound and widespread impact when it is disseminated
through televised debates. A majority of the population cites television
as its primary source of election information, and debates are regarded
as the "only occasion during a campaign when the attention of a large
portion of the American public is focused on the election, as well as
the only campaign information format which potentially offers
sufficient time to explore issues and policies in depth in a neutral
forum." 204
Thus, the First Amendment protects access to candidate debates and,
therefore, "a broadcaster cannot grant or deny access to a candidate debate

198. Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).

199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id.at 674.
202. Id. at 675.
203. Id.
204. Id. (quoting Congressional Research Service, Campaign Debates in Presidential
General Elections, summary, June 15, 1993).
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on the basis of whether it agrees with a candidate's views." 20 5 'And
2 6 the
Court concluded that the AETC debate was "a forum of some type.
Relying upon its public forum precedents, 207 however, the Supreme
Court ruled that the AETC debate was not a traditional public forum
because "the almost unfettered access of a traditional public forum would
be incompatible with the programming dictates a television broadcaster
must follow. ' 20 8 The Court also held that the debate was not a public forum
designated as such by the government because it was not made "generally
available" to any candidate for Arkansas's third district congressional
seat. 209 Instead, AETC made a candidate-by-candidate determination as to
who would be invited to the debate.21 ° The Court emphasized that "[a]
designated public forum is not created when the government allows
selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a
class of speakers. 21 ' The selective process used by AETC for its debate
made the forum nonpublic.
Even though the debate was a nonpublic forum, however, the
Supreme Court ruled that AETC's power to exclude candidates was not
unfettered. "To be consistent with the First Amendment," the Court wrote,
"the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on
the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the
purpose of the property." 21 2 The Supreme Court found that AETC excluded
Forbes not because of his viewpoints but because of his "objective lack of
support" among the public as a candidate for Congress. The Court termed
AETC's decision to exclude Forbes "a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral

205. Id. at 676.
206. Id.
207. In its discussion of the public forum theory, the Supreme Court cited Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). See Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
677 (1998).
208. Id. at 678.
209. See id. at 679.
210. See id. at 679-80.
211. Id. at 679. The Court further elaborated:
On one hand, the government creates a designated public forum when it makes its
property generally available to a certain class of speakers .... On the other hand,
the government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more
than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers,
whose members must then, as individuals, "obtain permission," to use it.
Id. (citation omitted).
212. Id. at 682 (citing Cornelius,473 U.S. at 800).
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exercise of journalistic discretion" that does not violate the First
Amendment.2 3
The Supreme Court, also wary of the chilling effect of the public
forum application to candidate debates on public broadcasting, noted that
the Eighth Circuit's ruling would result "in less speech, not more." 214 The
Court stated: "On logistical grounds alone, a public television editor might,
with reason, decide that the inclusion of all ballot-qualified candidates
would 'actually undermine the educational value and quality of debates"'
and "might choose not to air candidates' views at all. 215
Justice John Paul Stevens, along with Justices David Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the Eighth Circuit decision should
be affirmed because AETC's decision to exclude Forbes from the debate
failed to "adhere to well-settled constitutional principles. ' 216 He criticized
the majority of the Court for "barely mention[ing] the standardless
character" of AETC's exclusion of Forbes and "understat[ing] the
constitutional importance of the distinction
2 17 between state ownership and
private ownership of broadcast facilities.
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority that the crucial issue
in Forbes was whether AETC created its debate as a public forum or a
nonpublic forum. Instead, the dispositive issue in the case, according to
Justice Stevens, was whether AETC usedS the
218 specifically defined contours
of the debate forum in excluding Forbes. He questioned the "nearly
limitless discretion" under the flexible standard used by AETC in
excluding Forbes from the debate. "The importance of avoiding arbitrary or
viewpoint-based exclusions from political debates militates strongly in
favor of requiring the controlling state agency to use (and adhere to) preestablished [sic], objective 21 criteria
to determine who among qualified
9
candidates may participate."
Justice Stevens emphasized that the AETC staff members who
excluded Forbes from the debate were not ordinary journalists but state
employees. He compared AETC's control of the debate to a local
government official's authority to issue permits to use public facilities for
expressive activities. ° He concluded: "Requiring government employees

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 683.
Id. at 681 (citation omitted).
Id at 681 (citation omitted).
Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

218. See id. at 689-95.
219. Il at 693.
220. See id. at 689-95.
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to set out objective criteria by which they choose which candidates will
benefit from the significant media exposure that results from statesponsored political debates would alleviate some of the risk inherent in
allowing government agencies-rather than private entities-to stage
candidate debates."22'
VI. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The First Amendment right of the broadcast media in general and the
public broadcasters in particular has been expanded steadily over the years.
The editorial rights of public broadcasting stations is a case in point. The
statutory and judicial framework of public broadcasting has ensured that
public broadcast licensees exercise as much editorial discretion as their
commercial counterparts, if not more. 222 Of course, the constitutional
contours of the enhanced freedom of the press for public broadcasters
emerged from the notion that radio spectrum should be used for the
interest, convenience, and necessity of the American public.
Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes, one of the
most closely watched First Amendment cases of the Supreme Court's 1997
term, 224 carries significant implications for public broadcasting. The
immediate impact of Forbes was to settle various issues raised in several
lower court rulings on the public television stations' rights to exclude
minor-party candidates from political debates. The Court's decision in
Forbes was sorely needed as a judicial road map for the ever confusing
doctrinal justifications for taking an all-or-nothing position in favor of
public broadcasting or political candidates. As one journalism researcher
argued in 1997, "[s]tate-owned licensees need such [a precedential] opinion
in order to act
in the public interest and to be protected from litigation and
'2
legal costs. 21
The importance of the Court's ruling in Forbes cannot be
overemphasized. If the Eighth Circuit's decision had been affirmed, it
would have directly affected about two-thirds of the noncommercial
government-licensed television and radio stations, which are most likely to
sponsor debates among political candidates.226 "[A]il public broadcasters
221. Id. at 695.
222. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982).
223. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
224. See Greenhouse, supra note 13, at 28.
225. Laura E. Johnson, A Limbo of Ambiguity: The Editorial Rights of State-owned
Licensees 42 (unpublished research paper, University of Florida (Gainesville) (on file with
author)). Johnson presented her paper at the Association for Education in Journalism and
Mass Communication convention in Chicago on July 30-Aug. 2, 1997.
226. See Thomas C. Berg, Excluding a Candidate from a Debate on a State-owned
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with connection with gov[ernmentl could be forced to abandon public
affairs programming for fear of violating22 7 [the] First Amendment,"
according to several public television lawyers.
Indeed, it was not pure speculation that Forbes, if affirmed by the
Court, would have allowed judicial second guessing of the public
broadcasters' editorial decision-making process. This would lead the public
broadcast media to forgo, rather than sponsor, candidate debates to avoid
litigation from those excluded from the debates. As the Court aptly pointed
out in Forbes,"8 the decision of Nebraska Education Television,
immediately after ForbesII, to cancel a debate among the Democratic and
Republican nominees for U.S. Senate was a good illustration of the real
chilling effect of Forbes I and other similar decisions on public television
stations.229
Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit succinctly and persuasively discusses the "editorial
discretion" that public television needs in staging a debate among the
electoral candidates:
A debate cannot be staged without deciding who may participate in it,
and given the inescapable need to choose, the criterion of choice that
the television station used was as good as any. Speech values were on
both sides of the equation in Forbes. If, to avoid restricting speech, the
station invited all the candidates to participate in the debate, the time
available to the frontrunners would be curtailed, yet what frontrunners
have to say is probably more valuable to the audience than what the
fringe candidates have to say-probably, not certainly. Major parties
can originate as fringe parties, and fringe parties can contribute ideas
that are later picked up by major parties. Still, restricting the speech
opportunity of the frige
candidates may increase the speech benefits
of the debate overall.
Another cause of concern arising from Forbes-like litigation was an
inexorable financial drain on the public television media. It is common
knowledge that public broadcasting operates with a tight budget. "[Llegal
costs to the broadcaster may increase, as stations turn to legal counsel more
Television Station: EditorialJudgment or Suppression of Free Speech?, PREvIEw U.S. SUP.

CT. CASE., Sept. 18, 1997, at 40, 44.
227. PublicAffairs Programmingby Public Broadcastersat Risk in Court Case, COMM.
DAILY, Apr. 18, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter PublicAffairs Programming].
228. See Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681 (1998).
229. See C. David Kotok, ETV Cancels Debate Between Nelson, Hagel, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Aug. 23, 1996, at 1; C. David Kotok, Nelson, Hagel to Appear But Not Debate at
Fair,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1; Editorial, Minor-party Farce Denied
Voters a Debate,OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 27, 1996, at 10.
230. Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 701 (7th

Cir. 1998).
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frequently for advice on programming decisions," one commentator
noted.231 "In general, state-owned stations, as public, noncommercial
stations do not have unlimited funds to dedicate to legal counsel. Such
costs could also have a chilling effect on programming if excessive legal
costs reduce funds available for programming or equipment." 2
Awareness of AETN's litigation cost to defend Forbes since 1994
would probably lead most public broadcasting people to reconsider
committing their resources to staging political debates among major
candidates, while excluding, in good faith, fringe candidates whom they
have determined to be unworthy of inclusion. AETN spent more than two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars on its legal defense in Forbes to date,
"with more spending to come," according to AETN Executive Director
Susan Howarth.233
On the other hand, pre-Forbes state and federal court decisions had
confronted other related issues, including the First Amendment status of
public broadcasting employees as journalists, the distinction between
"political debates" vis- L-vis nondebate programs on public television, and
the public forum status of public television in First Amendment law. They
seem to have reached a consensus on reporters and editors that employees
of state-owned television stations act under the color of state.
But the judicial balancing of editorial discretion granted to state
employee/journalists differs from court to court. This was one of the thorny
problems facing the lower courts in Forbes, even though the judicial and
FCC interpretations of the Act were clear cut in holding that "every
broadcaster, whether public or private, [must] . ..use its own editorial
discretion to serve the public interest, and no broadcast may cede that
responsibility to members of the general public." 2 3
In this connection, what would be the most efficient means for
government-owned broadcasting licensees to serve the public interest in
sponsoring candidate debates? This question clearly challenged the Court
to set forth a functional guideline on balancing public broadcasters'
independent news judgments and candidates' rights to participate in statesponsored television debates. As the Forbes opinion indicates, the Court
avoided the challenge. As a result, lower courts are still left with no
guidance from Forbes as to when public broadcasting should be open to

231. Johnson, supra note 225, at 41.
232. 1d.
233. PublicAffairs Programming,supranote 227, at 4.
234. Brief for the FCC and the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Arkansas Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 520 U.S.
1114, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 1639 (1997) (No. 96-779).
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minor-party candidates as a forum. Instead of dictating a myopic and
intrusive blanket rule for the public stations, however, the Court might have
taken a calculated risk and let the public broadcasters devise their own
objective standards on sponsoring candidate debates within the framework
of journalistic freedom under the First Amendment.
The result of Forbesis that public broadcasters who intend to sponsor
political debates fall subject to less regulation than commercial
broadcasters. Currently, public television must follow few mandatory
preestablished criteria to determine which candidate to include in the
debate. In contrast, Congress requires private broadcasters to comply with
the political debate regulations under the Federal Election Campaigns
Act. z5
Meanwhile, the Court has addressed the question of whether public
broadcasting-not to mention commercial broadcasting-should be
considered a public or nonpublic forum, especially in the context of
political candidate debates. The Court declared unanimously that the
candidate debate is neither a traditional public forum nor a designated
public forum, but a nonpublic forum subject to reasonable restrictions.?
The Court correctly applied public forum concepts in Forbes. Most
importantly, however, it represents and further reinforces a judicial trend to
broaden the nonpublic forum while refusing to create new public forums if
possible.
In this regard, the clarifying restatement of the public forum test in
Forbesis expected to carry far-reaching ramifications for the future of the
public forum doctrine. That is, Justice Kennedy's discussion and
application of the public forum doctrine will serve as the definitional
guideline for courts in the post-Forbes era as they draw bright lines
between categories of government facilities. Chicago Acorn v.
MetropolitanPier & ExpositionAuthority,237 a 1998 case of the U.S. Court

235. The regulations promulgated under the Federal Election Campaigns Act read in
pertinent part:
(c) Criteriafor candidate selection. For all debates, staging organization(s)
must use pre-established [sic] objective criteria to determine which candidates
may participate in a debate. For general election debates, staging organization(s)
shall not use nomination by a particular political party as the sole objective
criterion to determine whether to include a candidate in a debate.
11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1998).
236. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined in his dissent,
stated: "The Court has decided that a state-owned television network has no 'constitutional
obligation to allow every candidate access to' political debates that it sponsors. I do not
challenge that decision." Arkansas Educ. TV Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
237. 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998).
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, is illustrative. Chief Judge Posner,
citing Forbes, declared that Navy Pier, owned by the Metropolitan Pier and
Exposition Authority (MPEA) in Chicago, is a nonpublic facility under the
First Amendment meaning because MPEA rents its meeting rooms to
organizations for use by their members and guests rather than by the public
at large. 238 Similarly, a federal district court in Missouri held that the
underwriting program of a state-owned university radio station is not a
designated public forum. "[T]he government does not create a designated
public forum when it reserves eligibility to a class of speakers who must
obtain permission to use the property," according to the district court. 2 9
The mechanical inclusion of minor-party candidates in television
debates under the blanket rule enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in ForbesH
might have been an improvement of the subjective standards used by
broadcasters in deciding which candidates to invite to the debates.
Nevertheless, it runs the risk of ignoring the value of individual
broadcasters' editorial judgments in ensuring an open marketplace of ideas
in television broadcasting. As the Court stated in 1973:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is
selection and choice of material. That editors-newspapers or
broadcast-can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no
reason to deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of
abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. M
To a considerable extent, the Court in Forbes has heeded the institutional
role of public broadcasting by expanding the open marketplace of ideas,
which is crucial to American body politic.
Is there any room for a legislative role in devising a fair test for
excluding minor-party candidates from public television debates? The
Court in Forbes answered: Yes. The majority acknowledged the possibility
that Congress might impose "neutral rules for access to public
broadcasting."2 1 Nonetheless, the Court's overture to Congress to provide
access for minor-party candidates may end up being an exercise in futility.
Given that various congressional attempts to reform the current system
have been unsuccessful thus far,242 Congress will not be inclined to pass
debate reform legislation in the near future, especially if the reform bill
aims to provide more debate opportunity for fringe candidates. "Allowing
major parties to choose criteria for inclusion seems naive," one law review
238. See id. at 700 (citing Forbes,523 U.S. at 679).
239. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Bennett, 29 F. Supp.2d 576, 584 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

240. CBS, Inc. v.Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973).
241. Forbes,523 U.S. at 675.

242. For a discussion of congressional efforts to reform political debates, see supra notes
63-78 and accompanying text.
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author explained in 1993, "since they have little incentive to voluntarily
include minor-party candidates. They lack such incentive because
conventional wisdom suggests that a lesser-known political figure
invariably gains credibility by sharing the political spotlight of his betterknown competitor. 243

243. Eisner, supra note 65, at 1017 n.193.

